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Government Disapproval of Religion 
* jay Wexler 
The Supreme Court's "endorsement test" for evaluating the constitutional-
ity of government sponsored symbols, displays, and messages regarding religion 
is notoriously controversial and has engendered enormous scholarly attention. 
In addition to government "endorsement" of religion, however, the test also 
prohibits the government from sending a message of "disapproval" of religion. 
The disapproval side of the endorsement test has not been subject to almost any 
scholarly discussion, which is not surprising given that until recently the courts 
have had no reason to entertain, much less sustain, challenges to alleged gov-
ernment disapproval of religion. In the last few years, however, due to a variety 
of social and cultural phenomena, several cases alleging disapproval have made 
it to the federal courts. This, then, is a good time to begin consideration of what 
the disapproval portion of the endorsement test should prohibit. In this Article, 
I defend the idea that courts should apply an "explicit negative reference" test 
to determine if the government has unconstitutionally disapproved of religion. 
After explaining and defending that test, the Article applies the test to the cas-
es of alleged disapproval that courts have been asked to consider. The Article 
concludes by suggesting that the increasing importance of the disapproval por-
tion of the endorsement test weighs strongly in favor of courts keeping the en-
dorsement test despite the departure of its creator, justice O'Connor, and the 
continued criticism leveled at it from courts and commentators. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
From its inception, the Supreme Court's so-called "endorsement 
test" for determining the constitutional validity of government sym-
bols, displays, and other messages that allegedly support religion has 
engendered extensive commentary and controversy. 1 The test re-
* Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law. The author thanks participants at 
the University of Colorado Summer Workshop on Law, Religion, and Culture and the Second 
International Consortium for Law and Religion Studies Conference on Religion and Constitu-
tions at the Pontifica Universidad Catolica de Chile for extremely helpful comments and ques-
tions on an earlier draft and Dave Hatton for tremendous research assistance. 
1. For a very selective sampling of this vast literature, see jesse H. Choper, The Endorse-
ment Test: Its Status and Desirability, 18 J.L. & POL'Y 499 (2002); B. jessie Hill, Putting Religious Sym-
bolism in Context: A Linguistic Critique of the Endorsement Test, 104 MICH. L. REV. 491 (2005); Wil-
liam P. Marshall, "We Know It When We See It" The Supreme Court and Establishment, 59 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 495 (1986); Steven D. Smith, Symbols, Perceptions. and Doctrinal Illusions: Establishment Neutral-
ity and the "No Endorsement" Test, 86 MICH. L. REV. 266 (1987). 
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quires courts to consider whether a reasonable observer would be-
lieve that the government has sent "a message to nonadherents that 
they are outsiders, not full members of the political community, and 
an accompanying message to adherents that they are insiders, fa-
vored members of the political community."2 Justice O'Connor first 
fashioned the test in her concurrence in the creche plus reindeer and 
elephant case of Lynch v. Donnelly in 1984,3 and five members of the 
Court subsequently subscribed to the test five years later in the giant 
Christmas tree next to a medium-sized menorah case of County of Al-
legheny v. ACLU.4 Critics of the test have been vociferous in their 
condemnation of the doctrine, arguing that it is hopelessly indeter-
minate, inconsistent with the original meaning of the Constitution, 
and biased toward majority faiths.5 Opponents also contend that the 
test wrongly elevates mere offense to a constitutionally cognizable 
injury and makes the federal courts look foolish. 6 Defenders of the 
endorsement test occasionally concede the silly-seemingness of the 
doctrine7 but generally argue that its flaws are outweighed by its 
strengths, most notably its furtherance of the primary goals of the 
Establishment Clause: keeping civil peace, respecting individual con-
science, and protecting religion from the dangerous effects of state 
support. 8 Although the Supreme Court continues to apply the en-
dorsement test in relevant situations, there is no doubt that Justice 
O'Connor's retirement in 2004 has left the test in a highly precari-
ous position. 9 
In all of the hubbub about endorsement, it can be easy to forget 
that the endorsement test is actually the endorsement/ disapproval 
test. The Court has always maintained that government may send 
neither a message of endorsement nor a message of disapproval of 
anyone's religion or of religion in general. As Justice O'Connor wrote 
2. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (O'Connor,]., concurring). 
3. I d. (holding that the town of Pawtucket had not violated the Establishment Clause by 
sponsoring a Christmas display involving a creche of baby jesus along with various secular ob-
jects like an elephant, clowns, and reindeer). 
4. Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573 (1989) (hold-
ing unconstitutional a state-sponsored display of a creche standing alone but refusing to strike 
down a display with a Christmas tree next to a menorah). 
5. For a discussion of the prominent critiques of the endorsement test, see Jay D. 
Wexler, The Endorsement Court, 21 WASH. U.).L. & POL'Y 263, 271-77 (2006). 
6. See id. at 274-75. 
7. At least I do. See id. at 287 (the test is widely perceived as "downright goofy"). 
8. For a defense of the endorsement test against the most prominent critiques, see id. at 
277-87. 
9. See, e.g., Adam Samaha, Endorsement Retires: From Religious Symbols to Anti-Sorting Princi-
ples, 2005 SUP. CT. REV. 135. 
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in Lynch: "What is crucial is that a government practice not have the 
effect of communicating a message of government endorsement or 
disapproval of religion. It is only practices having that effect, whether 
intentionally or unintentionally, that make religion relevant, in reali-
ty or public perception, to status in the political community." 10 Jus-
tice O'Connor restated in Allegheny that 
[a]n Establishment Clause standard that prohibits only 'coercive' 
practices or overt efforts at government proselytization . . . but 
fails to take account of the numerous more subtle ways that gov-
ernment can show favoritism to particular beliefs or convey a message 
of disapproval to others, would not, in my view, adequately protect the 
religious liberty or respect the religious diversity of the members of 
our pluralistic political community. I I 
Although there is no controversy over whether the test, as a formal 
matter, in fact prohibits the government from disapproving of reli-
gion, and although nearly every scholarly treatment of the endorse-
ment test mentions disapproval as part of the test, it is very rare to 
encounter any independent treatment of the disapproval side of the 
endorsement/disapproval test (which is what I will call the test from 
here on in, though I'll abbreviate it as "the E/D test"). Indeed, I 
know of no scholarly article that is devoted solely to the disapproval 
side of the E/D test. 
This lack of academic attention to government disapproval of re-
ligion is not surprising. Until 2009, no court had ever relied on a 
disapproval theory to strike down a government symbol, display, 
message, or other action, and claims of disapproval were exceedingly 
rare. 12 Recently, however, things have begun to change. The past few 
years have seen several serious claims of government disapproval of 
religion arrive in the federal courts, and on at least two occasions, 
these courts have held government action unconstitutional on this 
10. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 692 (I 984) (emphasis added). 
I I. Cnty. ol Allegheny v. ACLU Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 627-28 (1989) 
(emphasis added). 
I 2. l should note that I am talking here about independent claims of disapproval rather 
than disapproval claims that are inherently linked with claims of endorsement. For example, the 
creche in Allegheny was struck down as an endorsement of Christianity, id. at 599, but it is prob-
ably accurate to say that the Court thought the display was also a disapproval of non-Christian 
religions. In those cases, the question of disapproval is coextensive with the question of whether 
there is an endorsement. The kinds of cases that have not existed (until recently) are cases in 
which the court is asked to strike down a government action solely because that action disap-
proves of a religion without at the same time endorsing some other religion. 
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theory. 13 In 2009, a district court in California held that a public 
school teacher had violated the Establishment Clause by referring to 
religion as "superstitious nonsense." 14 The following a year, a closely 
divided en bane Ninth Circuit rejected a challenge to San Francisco's 
condemnation of the Catholic Church's position on gay adoption; 15 
three judges would have found that condemnation unconstitutional 
under the E/D test. 16 Finally in 2010, a district court in Oklahoma 
struck down a state constitutional amendment banning the use of 
Sharia law in state courts because the amendment "convey[ed] a 
message of disapproval of [the] plaintiff's faith." 17 
These cases make clear the importance of paying newfound at-
tention to the disapproval portion of the E/D test. Writing in 1992, 
Professor (later judge) Michael McConnell, in what might be the 
most comprehensive discussion of disapproval prior to this article, 
suggested in a total of two pages that the reason no court had ever 
found a government disapproval of religion up to that point had to 
do with the "structure of the Religion Clauses." 18 According to 
McConnell, when the government appears to be disapproving of reli-
gion, it generally has a "secular purpose for its action," and "there is 
no 'religion' that is being 'established."' 19 What the recent cases 
suggest, however, is that the lack of disapproval cases prior to recent 
years can be explained primarily by the existence of sociocultural 
forces that dissuaded government from expressing its official disap-
proval of religion and not by anything having to do with the "struc-
ture of the Religion Clauses." With the rise of post-9/11 anti-Islamic 
sentiment,20 the growth of the so-called "New Atheism" move-
13. In addition to the cases described below, see O'Connor v. Washburn Univ., 416 F.3d 
1216 (lOth Cir. 2005) (rejecting challenge to university statue allegedly disapproving of Catholi-
cism); Cal Parents for Equalization of Educ. Materials v. Noonan, 600 F. Supp. 2d 1088 (E.D. Cal. 
2009) (analyzing claims that California's Board of Education adopted textbooks denigrating 
Hinduism). 
14. C.F. v. Capistrano Unified Sch. Dist., 615 F. Supp. 2d ll37, 1146 (C.D. Cal. 2009), 
vacated sub nom. C. F. ex rei. Farnan v. Capistrano Unified Sch. Dist., 654 F.3d 976 (9th Cir. 2011), 
cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1566 (20 12). 
15. Catholic League v. City & Cnty. of S.F., 624 F.3d l 043 (9th Cir. 201 0), cert denied, 131 
S. Ct. 2875 (2011). 
16. !d. at 1053-57. 
17. Awad v. Ziriax, 754 F. Supp. 2d 1298, 1306 (W.O. Okla. 2010), aff'd, 670 F.3d 1111 
(lOth Cir. 2012). 
18. Michael W. McConnell, Religious Freedom at a Crossroads, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 115, 152 
(1992). 
19. Id. 
20. See 'Islamophobia' Felt 5 Years After 9/11, ABC NEWS (Sept. 9, 2006), 
http://abcnews.go.com/GMA/story?id=2413473; Lisa Wangsness, Religious Leaders Decry Anti-
Muslim Sentiment, BOSTON.COM (Sept. 7, 2010), http://www.boston.com/news/local/breaking_ 
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ment, 21 and the growing willingness of government units in predom-
inantly liberal locales to stand up for gay rights in the presence of 
conservative religious opposition, 22 it has recently become more so-
cially and politically acceptable in certain contexts for government to 
actively criticize religious faiths. For this reason, now is a good time 
to begin a scholarly conversation about what constitutes an uncon-
stitutional disapproval of religion and what role the anti-disapproval 
norm should play in overall Religion Clause jurisprudence. 
In this Article, I seek to begin this conversation in earnest. In 
Part II, I examine what the disapproval test should prohibit and pro-
pose what I call the "explicit negative reference" test for evaluating 
disapproval claims. I suggest that the Free Exercise Clause, rather 
than the E/0 test, is the appropriate framework for evaluating dis-
criminatory government activity that imposes a substantial burden 
on religious believers. I also argue that government messages ex-
pressing views about social, political, scientific, or other issues that 
do not explicitly refer to religion but are nonetheless offensive to re-
ligious believers are also not unconstitutional disapprovals, because 
if they were, the government would be unable to function. This 
leaves statements, displays, symbols, and other messages that explic-
itly refer to and condemn religion as subject to disapproval analysis. 
This task will be in many cases as difficult and controversial as a typ-
ical endorsement analysis but equally as important to keeping the 
government from taking explicit positions on religious truth or val-
ue. Several specific issues are likely to arise with some frequency in 
disapproval analysis, such as the importance of context and the ques-
tion of whether government can critique the social views of specific 
religious groups. This Article addresses these issues in particular. I 
conclude that the set of cases subject to disapproval analysis is rela-
tively small but potentially quite significant given recent trends. 
After Part III examines the three specific cases mentioned above, 
with an eye toward further clarifying the reach of the disapproval 
news/2010/09/religious_leade.html (noting a recent increase in anti-Muslim sentiment). 
21. See, e.g., Simon Hooper, The Rise of the 'New Atheists,' CNN (Nov. 8, 2006), 
http:/ /articles.cnn.com/2006-11-08/world/atheism.feature _1_ new-atheists-new-atheism-
religion?_ s =PM: WORLD. 
22. See Nicholas Confessore & Michael Barbaro, New York Allows Same-Sex Marriage, Becom-
ing Largest State to Pass Law, N.Y. TIMES, june 25, 2011, at AI (noting that the New York legisla-
ture passed a gay marriage bill despite opposition from Catholic bishops and other religious ob-
jections); Tim Craig, Nikita Stewart & Michelle Boorstein, Washington Mayor Fenty Signs Same-Sex 
Marriage Bill, WASH. PosT, Dec. 19, 2009, at BOI (noting that the mayor of Washington, D.C., 
signed a gay marriage bill into law despite threats from the Catholic Church to end social ser-
vices contracts with the city if the bill passed). 
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test, I conclude in Part IV with this observation about the state of 
Establishment Clause doctrine: given that the disapproval test is 
necessary to keep the government from casting explicit harmful as-
persions on religion, and given that the disapproval test is inherently 
linked to the endorsement test, the Supreme Court would be wise to 
retain the E/D test despite justice O'Connor's departure from the 
Court and the continuing stream of criticism aimed at the test. 
Without the E/D test, no legal doctrine will exist to keep the gov-
ernment from explicitly criticizing religious belief, a phenomenon 
that seems likely to become more prevalent as religious diversity in 
the United States continues to increase. 
II. WHAT IS GOVERNMENT DISAPPROVAL OF RELIGION? 
Professor McConnell's discussion of disapproval provides a nice 
starting point to consider the proper scope of the doctrine. 
McConnell was writing about disapproval as part of his comprehen-
sive critique of the E/D test; one point of his argument against the 
test was its "bias against religion."23 His argument on this score ba-
sically proceeds in two parts. First, he argues that courts have never 
used, and will likely never have reason to use, the disapproval prong 
of the E/0 test because when the government does something that 
sends a message of disapproval of any given religion, it is typically 
not establishing any other religion and will typically have a secular 
purpose for sending this message of disapproval.24 McConnell's ex-
ample involves public schools that want to train their students to use 
condoms. Such training clearly disapproves, according to McConnell, 
of a "tenet of the Roman Catholic Church," but it won't count as an 
unconstitutional disapproval because "there is no 'religion' of con-
dom advocacy on the other side-nothing but a particular secular 
view regarding public health and sexual hygiene."25 Thus, 
McConnell concludes: "When the government prefers secular ideas 
to religious ideas, it does not violate the Establishment Clause, no 
matter how strong the 'message of disapproval.'"26 Second, 
McConnell contends that while "[t]he appearance of disapproval 
more plausibly violates the Free Exercise Clause," courts have re-
fused to find free exercise violations in the absence of some specific 
burden placed upon believers by government action, and these same 
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courts have been extraordinarily stingy when deciding whether some 
action has in fact imposed such a burden.27 As his example here, 
McConnell uses the famous Mozert case,28 in which the Sixth Circuit 
refused to find unconstitutional a school district's policy of teaching 
from textbooks that included material offensive to the religious be-
liefs of some parents. McConnell believes that Mozert is inconsistent 
with the Court's creche cases.29 "Why is compelled exposure to gov-
ernmental messages denigrating one's religion constitutional," 
McConnell wonders, "while avoidable exposure to governmental 
messages favorable to another religion is not?"30 
Understanding why McConnell's argument is flawed is key to 
figuring out what role the disapproval prong of the E/0 test should 
ideally play in reviewing government action that appears contrary to 
some particular religious belief or tradition. Starting with 
McConnell's second critique-the one involving the Free Exercise 
Clause-! would argue that while the critique is correct to challenge 
the specific result in Mozert, it actually has nothing to do with delin-
eating the proper scope of the disapproval prong. Requiring students 
to study viewpoints or information that is deeply offensive to their 
religious beliefs or the religious beliefs of their parents (in Mozert the 
material was alleged to be offensive for many reasons, including its 
emphasis on sexual equality and its insistence on evolution's 
truth) 31 should count as an actionable burden on religious belief, re-
quiring the government to pass strict scrutiny to avoid a free exercise 
violation. This is not the law under current doctrine, 32 but it should 
be. However, the remedy for a free exercise violation is to grant an 
exemption to the plaintiff, not to prohibit the government from tak-
ing the action altogether. Thus, the remedy in Mozert, if the court 
had considered it a free exercise violation, would have been to ex-
empt the relevant students from studying the challenged lessons. 
This is the only remedy that makes any sense, because if the gov-
ernment were unable to present information to anyone that is reli-
giously offensive to someone, simply because the information was in-
consistent with someone's religious belief, it is hard to see how the 
27. Id. 
28. Mozert v. Hawkins Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 827 F.2d 1058 (6th Cir. 1987). 
29. McConnell, supra note 18, at 152-53. 
30. Id. at 153. 
31. Mozert, 827 F.2d at 1062. 
32. See id. at 1065; see also Emp't Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990) (holding that 
even a substantial burden placed on religious believers will not require a free exercise exemption 
if that burden is imposed by a neutral law of general application). 
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public schools could function at all, given the extreme variety of reli-
gious views on almost every imaginable issue. They certainly could 
not teach evolution, the big bang theory, or the notion that the earth 
is a sphere. 33 They might not be able to serve beef or pork in their 
cafeterias.34 They certainly couldn't teach such widely shared values 
as sexual and racial equality, tolerance, or nonviolence.35 
This insight answers McConnell's question about the difference 
between Mozert and the creche cases.36 Mozert is rightly conceived of 
as posing a free exercise question, with an exemption as the possible 
remedy, while the creche cases pose an establishment issue, with the 
potential remedy being an injunction of the challenged display. It 
would make no sense to conceive of the creche display as a free exer-
cise issue, because how could a court possibly grant an exemption to 
a nonbeliever (and here, recall, a nonbeliever includes not only non-
theists but Jews, Buddhists, Hindus, Taoists, and other non-
Christians) from having to look at the display? Moreover, it is not 
the case that the government would cease to function if it could not 
specifically endorse any religious belief. Could the government con-
tinue if it were unable to display a Menorah or a Buddha or the Ten 
Commandments or even a Christmas tree on public property? Of 
course it could. 
All this is to say only that government actions that actually im-
pose a burden on religious believers by compelling them to do some-
thing that offends their religious beliefs, or prevents them from en-
gaging in their religious practices in a way that it would potentially 
make sense to exempt them from the government requirement, 
should be considered under the Free Exercise Clause rather than the 
Establishment Clause. These actions are therefore analytically dis-
tinct from government messages, symbols, displays, and other ac-
33. See FLAT EARTH Soc'Y, http://rheflatearthsociety.org/cms/ (last visited Oct. 21, 2012); 
see also Terry Mortenson, Systematic Theology Texts and the Age of the Earth: A Response to the Views of 
Erickson, Grudem, and Lewis and Demarest, 2 ANSWERS RES. ]. 175 (2009), available at 
http://www .answersingenesis.org/ contents/3 79 /arj/v2/Systematic _theology_ Erickson 
_ Grudem _Lewis. pdf (arguing that the earth is only 6,000 years old and rejecting evolution as the 
origin of life). 
34. See What zs Halal?, ISLAMIC FOOD & NUTRITIONAL COUNCIL AM., 
http:/ /www.ifanca.org/cms/wpages/detail/4ca47c89-ec4c-41 ba-ac38-1cl11 b830f0c (last visited 
Oct. 21, 2012) (stating that members of the Islamic faith do not eat pork). 
35. See, e.g., Aryan Nations/Church of jesus Christ Christian, ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE, 
http:/ /www.adl.org/learn/ext_us/ Aryan_ Nations.asp?LEARN _Cat= Extremism&LEARN _ SubCa 
t=Extremism_in_America&xpicked=3&item=an (last visited Oct. 21, 2012) (describing the 
Church of jesus Christ Christians as a religious group that believes God created only the "white 
race" and calls for the destruction of all other races). 
36. See McConnell, supra note 18, at 153. 
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tions for which exemptions make no sense as a remedy; these latter 
actions are more appropriately treated as establishment issues, and 
are therefore the only ones that should be subject to endorsement or 
disapproval analysis. 
So, condoms. Given the above analysis, it would be helpful to 
distinguish two analytically different aspects of a public school policy 
to train students to use condoms to prevent pregnancy and venereal 
diseases. On the one hand is the part of the policy requiring students 
to actually undergo the training-to listen to a lecture about the im-
portance of condom use, to hear the teacher say "when you have 
sexual intercourse, use a condom," to practice putting a condom on 
something, etc. This is rightly conceived of as a free exercise prob-
lem-if it constitutes a burden on the students' religion (which I 
think it probably would), then the students should be exempt from 
the lesson under the Free Exercise Clause. McConnell argues that in 
addition to this specific compulsion, the condom policy also sends a 
general message to the relevant population that the government 
thinks condom use is appropriate. Under McConnell's view, this 
message presumably constitutes a disapproval of religion and should 
be enjoined by the courts as an Establishment Clause violation if 
those courts are serious about applying an evenhanded E/0 test.37 
Now we're really starting to get to the heart of the issue. Does 
such a message, standing alone-"condom use is good"-constitute 
a disapproval of religion? For clarity's sake, it might help to dis-
aggregate the issues going on with the classroom example and imag-
ine examples that do not involve compulsion. Imagine instead a pub-
lic school principal giving a public speech where he or she announces 
to the community that the school should teach condom use because 
condoms promote public health, or maybe a city council issuing a 
resolution to the same effect. These examples involve no compulsion 
(nobody is required to practice putting a condom on anything, or in-
deed even to attend the speech or read the resolution) and therefore 
do not raise free exercise issues. But are they unconstitutional disap-
provals under the Establishment Clause? 
To understand why they are not requires returning to the point 
made earlier about how the public schools could not function if every 
message they sent could be challenged for implicitly disapproving of 
somebody's religious beliefs. What is true for the public schools is 
just as true for government in general. Given the vast diversity of re-
ligious beliefs held by Americans, the variety of viewpoints held by 
3 7. See id. at 152. 
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these religions on almost every imaginable issue, and the plethora of 
ways that the government sends messages through its actions on a 
daily basis, government would cease to function if messages like 
"condom use is good" could be enjoined by religious believers.38 
Should a Quaker pacifist be able to challenge the President's speech 
explaining the need for military vigilance against global enemies? 
Should an Orthodox Jew be able to challenge the government's sup-
port for "the other white meat" or a particularly strict Jain be able to 
challenge the FDA's support for a diet high in vegetables? Should a 
religious polygamist be able to challenge the mayor's praise of mo-
nogamous marriages? Some religious believers object on the basis of 
their religion to values widely shared and held dear by most Ameri-
cans, such as loyalty to the country, equality of all citizens, and tol-
erance of diverse viewpoints.39 Surely, it cannot count as a disap-
proval of religion for the government to expressly support these 
values. 
Therefore, if we agree that the government must continue, we 
must concede that general messages that implicitly disapprove of 
views held by one or more religious believers cannot count as uncon-
stitutional disapprovals under the E/0 test. But this just brings us 
right back to McConnell's essential objection. Isn't McConnell right 
that this is unfair and demonstrates the lopsidedness (and thus 
worthlessness) of the E/0 test? If the government cannot send a 
message that endorses religion, why should it be able to send a mes-
sage that disapproves of it?40 
For this claim of unfairness to be persuasive, a strong analogy 
has to exist between the type of message claimed to be a disapproval 
("condom use is good") and the type of messages or displays that 
courts have held to be unconstitutional endorsements (a stand-alone 
cross or creche on public property). The analogy, however, does not 
work. The stand-alone cross refers explicitly to religion, while the 
condom message only implicitly disapproves of religion. This differ-
ence is crucial, because the government rarely ever has to explicitly 
refer to religion, either to endorse it or to disapprove it, while the 
government (if it is to function at all) must be given the power to 
take and communicate positions that happen to implicitly either en-
38. See, e.g., jAY WEXLER, HOLY HULLABALOOS: A ROAD TRIP TO THE BATTLEGROUNDS OF 
THE CHURCH/STATE WARS 214-15 (2009). 
39. See supra note 35; see also Jerry Bergman, The Modern Religious Objection to Mandatory Flag 
Salute in America: A History and Evaluation, 39 ]. CHURCH & ST. 215, 226 (1997) (stating that some 
Mennonite groups object to saluting the American flag). 
40. See McConnell, supra note 18, at 152--53. 
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dorse or disapprove of some religious viewpoint. The proper analogy, 
then, to the "condom use is good" example is not the creche or 
cross, but rather to a governmental message that is consistent with a 
particular religious belief but does not explicitly refer to it or rely 
upon it for support-in other words, something like "abstinence is 
good." No court has held nor likely will ever hold that a policy of 
teaching abstinence (which, after all, has been supported by vast 
amounts of government funding as of late) 41 constitutes a constitu-
tional endorsement of religion, even though many people surely per-
ceive that policy as endorsing a particular orthodox religious view-
point. The government takes positions all the time that are 
consistent with specific religious beliefs and may likely be perceived 
by certain nonbelievers as a statement of support for that religious 
viewpoint. Consider, for instance, the following: refusing to publicly 
fund abortions; prohibiting late-term abortions; engaging in wars 
that are considered "just"; outlawing homicide, adultery, and theft; 
providing welfare to the poor; and taxing vices like liquor and ciga-
rettes. From somebody's perspective, all of these things are likely to 
be perceived as endorsements of religion, in the same way that 
McConnell perceives "condom use is good" as a disapproval of reli-
gion, but finding them to be unconstitutional endorsements would 
make government largely impossible. 
On the other hand, the government rarely if ever needs to explic-
itly endorse or disapprove of religion in general or a specific religion 
in particular. Thus, the proper analogy to the stand-alone cross is not 
"condom use is good" but rather something that explicitly criticizes 
a condom-disapproving religion-for example, a display of a cross 
with an "X" through it or an official statement to the effect of: "The 
Catholic Church is Wrong. Condom Use is Good." With respect to 
the latter statement, if the government is free (as it must be) to say 
that condom use is good, what possible need would it have to add 
the part condemning the Catholic Church? It is the addition of these 
few words that turns a constitutionally acceptable statement into 
one that violates the disapproval prong of the E/D test. 
The "explicit negative reference" test, as I will call it here, has 
several features to recommend it. First, by allowing the government 
to take positions on important public issues so long as it does not 
explicitly refer to religion in a derogatory fashion, the test ensures 
41. See john E. Taylor, Family Values, Courts, and Culture War: The Case of Abstinence-Only Sex 
Education, 18 WM. & MARY BJLL RTS. ]. 1053, 1062-66 (2010) (observing that "roughly 1.5 billion 
federal dollars" has gone to abstinence only education). 
129 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2013 
that government can continue to function effectively. Second, by out-
lawing only explicit negative references to religion, the test focuses 
on the government action that is most harmful to religion and most 
likely to make believers feel like outsiders in the political communi-
ty. Third, framing the test in this way creates a fair parallel with the 
Court's current endorsement analysis; far from the E/D test being 
lopsided, as McConnell asserts, the test actually prohibits the gov-
ernment from sending analogous messages on both sides of the en-
dorsement/disapproval divide. Finally, although it will certainly not 
always be easy for a court to decide if the government has disap-
proved of religion under the "explicit negative reference" test, the 
test at least attempts to provide some relatively clear guidance re-
garding what the government may say and what it may not. 
Another example. Some religious believers-for instance, at least 
some members of the Christian Science Church-believe that sick 
people should pray for help and seek the care of a religious healer ra-
ther than going to a traditional medical doctor.42 Assume that some 
federal study showed that fewer people were going to see medical 
doctors than they should, and that this was costing lives and perhaps 
draining the economy as well (perhaps because people were waiting 
until they got really sick to see a doctor). The government knows 
about Christian Scientists, and it also knows that some people refuse 
to go to doctors for other reasons unrelated to religion. Imagine that 
the Secretary of Health and Human Services then issues an an-
nouncement to try and convince people to go see doctors when they 
get sick. Boiled down to their basic message, we might imagine four 
different types of announcements, as follows: 
(1) If you are sick, then you should go to see a medical doctor. 
(2) If you are sick, then the only thing you can do is to see a medi-
cal doctor; no other option will help. 
(3) Prayer will not help you. If you are sick, go see a medical doctor. 
(4) Christian Science doctrine is false. If you are sick, go see a med-
ical doctor. 
In a sense, of course, all four of these statements express disap-
proval of a central tenet of the Christian Science faith, just as "con-
doms are good" expresses disapproval, as McConnell explains, of a 
central tenet of the Catholic faith. In my view, however, only state-
42. What is Christian Science?, CHRISTIAN Sci., http:/ /christianscience.com/what-is-
christian-science#basic-teachings (last visited Sept. 18, 2012). 
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ments (3) and (4) should be held unconstitutional under the E/D 
test, statement (3) for explicitly disapproving of an inherently reli-
gious activity (prayer), and statement (4) for explicitly disapproving 
of a specific faith. Because statements (1) and (2) do not explicitly 
refer to religion, they should not be held unconstitutional, even 
though they are certainly not neutral with respect to the central be-
liefs of the Christian Science tradition. To the obvious retort that the 
test I am suggesting is essentially arbitrary, I would concede that it is 
to an extent, but that it is nonetheless advantageous for the reasons 
provided two paragraphs ago.43 
The test is certainly formalistic, in that it looks to the content of 
the utterance or message or display itself to determine if there is an 
explicit negative reference to religion. What if, as may occasionally 
be the case (we will see a real world example in Part III), 44 the gov-
ernment says something like statement (1) or (2) in direct response 
to a private religious individual or group's statement to the contrary? 
Imagine, for instance, that a Christian Science group launches an ad-
vertising campaign in a town that urges citizens to consider forgoing 
medical help and to rely on religious healers instead. For whatever 
reason, many citizens of the town find themselves persuaded by the 
religious message. The mayor of the town is worried, and he sends 
the following message, perhaps through a speech or a counter-
advertising campaign: 
(5) A Christian Science group has urged citizens not to see medical 
doctors for their health problems. The government urges you in-
stead to seek the advice of medical doctors if you become ill. Seek-
ing the advice of a medical doctor is the only safe way to deal with a 
serious illness. 
This message is constitutional, because although it clearly re-
sponds to a position held by a religious group, it does not explicitly 
condemn that religious group or its viewpoint. The courts must al-
low government to make a statement like (5), because if they do not, 
the government will not be able to usefully put forth divergent views 
on important social and cultural issues whenever those issues are in-
itially raised by a religious group. Although the government could 
put forth its own views without referring to the views of the reli-
gious group first, such a requirement would make it unduly difficult 
for the government to get its message across effectively by placing it 
in context. Many listeners may have no idea why suddenly the gov-
43. See supra notes 38-42 and accompanying text. 
44. See infra notes 48-67 and accompanying text. 
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ernment is counseling its citizens to seek medical advice if they be-
come ill. The question is close, but the need for the government's 
messages to be understood in context should outweigh the slightly 
increased sense of disapproval felt by religious believers who have 
attracted the government's criticism. On the other hand, the gov-
ernment will rarely, if ever, have a need to go further by explicitly 
condemning the religious idea, as in this hypothetical statement: 
(6)A Christian Science group has urged citizens not to see medical 
doctors for their health problems. The group's message is wrong 
and harmful. Please seek the advice of a medical doctor if you be-
come ill. 
The government's message is fully and adequately communicated 
by statement (5). All statement ( 6) adds to statement (5) is an ex-
plicit criticism of the religious group, with no attendant benefit. 
Such a statement should therefore be found unconstitutional. But 
what about statement (7)? 
(7)A Christian Science group has urged citizens not to see medical 
doctors for their health problems. We disagree. The government urg-
es you instead to seek the advice of medical doctors if you become 
ill. Seeking the advice of a medical doctor is the only safe way to 
deal with a serious illness. 
This may be the most difficult case. Does the benefit of adding 
something like "we disagree" to the government's message here 
outweigh the additional harm to the religion that the explicit state-
ment of disagreement adds? It is hard to say. My inclination is to al-
low statement (7) as being more analogous to statement (5) than 
statement (6), since the statement lacks an explicit criticism of 
Christian Science doctrine, but reasonable minds may surely differ. 
At this point, a possible objection to the explicit negative refer-
ence test could be that it actually gives the disapproval side of the 
E/D test more force than the endorsement side in one important 
sense, in that it prohibits the government from saying anything ex-
plicitly critical of a religion's social views or practices but does not 
prohibit the government from saying something explicitly compli-
mentary about a religion's social views or practices. For instance, the 
government may clearly approve of, congratulate, compliment, or 
point to as a model some religious group or church or organization 
that provides benefits to the community. Such a message-for ex-
ample, "We are deeply proud of the services that X church has pro-
vided to the poor citizens of our commonwealth" -would never be 
held to be an unconstitutional endorsement of the church. Why, 
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therefore, should the government not be able to make a statement 
like (6) above or to say "we condemn this church for the harm it has 
brought upon the children of the commonwealth"? The reason is 
that the two messages are not really analogous. Praise of one religion 
for doing something good for society, which does not implicate the 
truth or inherent value of the religious tradition, does not send a 
message to other religions and nonreligious people that they are dis-
favored, unless perhaps those other people and groups have done 
something obviously exactly the same as the £raised group but have 
not received the same governmental support. 5 Such instances (e.g., 
a Christian church and the next-door Hindu temple provide the exact 
same services for the poor, but the mayor singles out the church for 
praise and not the temple) are likely extremely rare. In the typical 
case of praise, then, no negative message is being sent to nonbeliev-
ers. In a typical case of explicit disapproval, however, the negative 
message to believers is obvious. 
Still, though, this difference in how the doctrine applies to en-
dorsements and disapprovals makes me slightly uncomfortable, and 
for that reason (as well as the wisdom in moving incrementally in 
difficult areas of law), 46 I would suggest that the courts at least ten-
tatively apply a strict scrutiny standard to disapprovals rather than 
striking them down automatically (the norm for endorsements). If 
the government can show that the explicit referral to religion is ab-
solutely necessary to fulfill a compelling interest, then perhaps the 
disapproval should be allowed. One could imagine a situation arising 
where the government has to explicitly condemn a particular reli-
gious group to communicate its message effectively, perhaps in an 
emergency where the government finds itself in direct violent con-
flict with the group. The cases where this would arise should be ex-
tremely rare, but the doctrine should allow for the possibility, at 
least until it becomes clear to courts that the extremely narrow ex-
ception is unnecessary. 
By proposing what might appear to be a single-factor test for 
evaluating alleged governmental disapprovals of religion, I certainly 
do not mean to imply that application of the test will be at all simple 
or straightforward. Quite the contrary. Given that the test occupies 
the other side of the coin of the notoriously indeterminate endorse-
45. Or perhaps if the other religious groups' beliefs compel them to act in exactly the op-
posite way-for example, if a Christian church hosts a blood drive that local Jehovah's Witnesses 
feel religiously compelled to oppose and picket. 
46. See, e.g., Jay D. Wexler, Defending the Middle Way: Intermediate Scrutiny as judicial Minimal-
ism, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 298, 309 (1998). 
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ment inquiry, I would expect application of the disapproval standard 
to be equally difficult. First, it may be hard in some cases for courts 
to determine if a reference to religion is explicit. Likely more difficult 
will be the question of whether any given message constitutes a 
"disapproval." Second, as with the question of endorsement, courts 
will have to give nuanced consideration to all the relevant circum-
stances to figure out the meaning of any given message, symbol, or 
displayY Finally, some cases-for example, when a public school or 
museum seeks to explain or illustrate how some people feel about a 
particular religious tradition or school within a religion or religion in 
general-will raise the issue of who is actually sending the message, 
the government itself or the person or persons whose message the 
government is trying to explain. As we will see in the next Part of 
the Article, many of these difficult issues are raised by the three dis-
approval cases that reached the federal courts in recent years that I 
mentioned in the Introduction. Investigation of these cases will pro-
vide a fuller understanding of the disapproval inquiry and the "ex-
plicit negative reference" test, while also demonstrating that the E/D 
test's disapproval prohibition plays an important role in enforcing 
key values furthered by the First Amendment's Religion Clauses. 
Ill. THE COURTS ENCOUNTER DISAPPROVAL 
A. Catholic League v. San Francisco 
In 2003, the Catholic Church's Congregation for the Doctrine of 
the Faith, sitting in the Vatican, issued its official view that Catholics 
around the world should oppose efforts to legalize or promote gay 
marriage or to allow gay couples to adopt children. Cardinal William 
Levada, the head of the Congregation, specifically ordered the Arch-
diocese of San Francisco not to place children for adoption with gay 
couples. The San Francisco Board of Supervisors responded by pass-
ing the following resolution ("Resolution 168-06"): 
Resolution urging Cardinal William Levada, in his capacity as head 
of the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith at the Vatican, to 
withdraw his discriminatory and defamatory directive that Catholic 
Charities of the Archdiocese of San Francisco stop placing children 
in need of adoption with homosexual households. 
47. And, of course, the disapproval inquiry raises all of the familiar doctrinal and theoret-
ical issues that are perennially raised by the endorsement question-e.g., who is the reasonable 
observer, and what should courts assume about the reasonable observer's understanding of his-
torical context? Clearly these are difficult issues, and l make no attempt to address them here. 
For my views on some of these issues, see Wexler, supra note 5, at 282-85. 
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WHEREAS, It is an insult to all San Franciscans when a foreign 
country, like the Vatican, meddles with and attempts to negatively 
influence this great City's existing and established customs and 
traditions such as the right of same-sex couples to adopt and care 
for children in need; and 
WHEREAS, The statements of Cardinal Levada and the Vatican 
that "Catholic agencies should not place children for adoption in 
homosexual households," and "Allowing children to be adopted by 
persons living in such unions would actually mean doing violence 
to these children" are absolutely unacceptable to the citizenry of 
San Francisco; and 
WHEREAS, Such hateful and discriminatory rhetoric is both insult-
ing and callous, and shows a level of insensitivity and ignorance 
which has seldom been encountered by this Board of Supervisors; 
and 
WHEREAS, Same-sex couples are just as qualified to be parents as 
are heterosexual couples; and 
WHEREAS, Cardinal Levada is a decidedly unqualified representa-
tive of his former home city, and of the people of San Francisco and 
the values they hold dear; and 
WHEREAS, The Board of Supervisors urges Archbishop Niederauer 
and the Catholic Charities of the Archdiocese of San Francisco to 
defy all discriminatory directives of Cardinal Levada; now, there-
fore, be it 
RESOLVED, That the Board of Supervisors urges Cardinal William 
Levada, in his capacity as head of the Congregation for the Doctrine 
of the Faith at the Vatican (formerly known as Holy Office of the 
Inquisition), to withdraw his discriminatory and defamatory di-
rective that Catholic Charities of the Archdiocese of San Francisco 
stop placing children in need of adoption with homosexual house-
holds.48 
Following the issuance of the Resolution, two devout Catholics 
living in San Francisco, along with a Catholic civil rights organiza-
tion, sued the city, claiming that the Resolution violated the Estab-
lishment Clause because it sent a message of disapproval of the 
Catholic Church. The district court found no Establishment Clause 
48. Catholic League v. City & Cnty. of S.F., 624 F.3d 1043, 1047 (9th Cir. 2010) (empha-
sis omitted) (quoting S.F., CAL., REs. No. 168~06 (2006), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 2875 (2011). 
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violation, 49 and the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's dis-
missal. 50 The Ninth Circuit then granted rehearing en bane. 51 
In a complicated set of opinions issued in October of 20 l 0, the 
en bane Ninth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the complaint. 52 The 
court split on both the merits of the plaintiffs' challenge and on the 
question whether the plaintiffs had standing. In an opinion written 
by Judge Graber, five judges concluded that the plaintiffs lacked 
standing.53 In an opinion written by Judge Silverman, three judges 
concluded that although the plaintiffs did have standing, they lost on 
the merits. 54 Finally, in an opinion written by Judge Kleinfeld, three 
judges found that the plaintiffs had standing and succeeded on the 
merits. Put together, then, the court voted 8-3 to affirm the district 
court's dismissal. 55 The standing question is, of course, quite diffi-
cult and important. Here, however, I will focus only on the merits of 
the disapproval claim, upon which the court evenly split 3-3, with 
five judges reaching no opinion on the matter. 
Judge Silverman's opinion, finding that the city's Resolution did 
not violate the Establishment Clause, rested on the view that the 
government is free to criticize the secular positions taken by reli-
gious individuals and organizations so long as this criticism is moti-
vated by a secular purpose. Here, according to the three judges who 
subscribed to this view, the city had merely expressed its longstand-
ing secular views about the acceptability of placing children for adop-
tion with same-sex couples, and the fact that these views were ac-
companied by critiques of a religious organization made no 
difference to the result. 56 It was key for these three judges that the 
city had expressed its view on a secular issue (adoption by same-sex 
couples) as opposed to a theological one. "We would have a different 
case on our hands," wrote Judge Silverman, "had the defendants 
called upon Cardinal Levada to recant his views on transubstantia-
tion."57 According to the judges, public officials have every "right to 
speak out in their official capacities on matters of secular concern to 
their constituents, even if their statements offend the religious feel-
49. Catholic League v. City & Cnty. ofS.F., 464 F. Supp. 2d 938 (N.D. Cal. 2006). 
50. Catholic League v. City & Cnty. ofS.F., 567 F.3d 595 (9th Cir. 2009). 
51. Catholic League v. City & Cnty. ofS.F., 586 F.3d 1166, 1167 (9th Cir. 2010). 
52. Catholic League, 624 F.3d at 1046. 
53. Id. at 1062-82 (Graber,]., concurring). 
54. Id. at 1060-62 (Silverman,].. concurring). 
55. I d. at 1046-60 (Kleinfeld,]., plurality opinion). 
56. Id. at 1055-56, 1060. 
57. ld. at 1061 (Silverman,].. concurring). 
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ings of some."58 If "the mere fact that a resolution calls out a church 
or a clergyman"59 were enough to turn government speech into a 
constitutional violation, then "the Establishment Clause would gag 
secular officials from responding to religious entities even when 
those entities have chosen to enter the secular fray." 60 
The three judges who came out the other way on the merits saw 
things quite differently. Beginning with the observation that " [ w ]e 
have not found another Establishment Clause case brought by peo-
ple whose religion was directly condemned by their government" 61 
and citing a Free Exercise Clause decision of the Court62 announcing 
"the principle that government has no legitimate role under the Es-
tablishment Clause in judging the religious beliefs of the people-
either by praise or denunciation,"63 these three judges found that the 
city had expressed a clear and explicit message of disapproval of the 
Catholic Church. Although the city would have been fine if it had 
limited itself to the fourth "whereas" in the Resolution-the one 
stating that same-sex couples are just as qualified to be parents as 
heterosexual couples-it had gone too far in the rest of the Resolu-
tion. 64 "The 'message' . . . is explicit," concluded the judges: "a 
Catholic doctrine duly communicated by the part of the Catholic 
church in charge of clarifying doctrine is 'hateful,' 'defamatory,' 'in-
sulting,' 'callous,' and 'discriminatory,' showing 'insensitivity and 
ignorance.' . . . This is indeed a 'message of . . . disapproval.'"65 
The three judges on this side of the merits issue were expressly con-
cerned with issues of fairness and practicality. With regard to mat-
ters of practicality, the judges cited possible "serious consequences" 
that could ensue when the government sends a message of disap-
proval-everything from vandalism to religious discrimination in the 
workplace to having one's car "keyed in the parking lot."66 On the 
fairness issue, the judges were concerned that the Establishment 
Clause's anti-disapproval standard be enforced just as strongly as its 
anti-endorsement rule. As judge Kleinfeld put it, "[n]o practical or 
fair reading could construe the Establishment Clause as prohibiting 
58. Id. at 1060. 
59. Jd. at 1061. 
60. Jd. 
61. Jd. at 1054 (Kleinfeld, j., plurality opinion). 
62. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 532 (1992). 
63. Catholic League, 624 F.3d at 1054 (Kleinfeld, j., plurality opinion). 
64. !d. at I 055. 
65. ld. at 1057. 
66. /d. at I 059. 
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only government endorsement and not government condemnation of 
religion. "67 
I chose to discuss this case first among the three cases in this 
Part because it follows closely on the issues raised in Part II. Here we 
have a government entity directly responding to the pronouncement 
of a religious organization on an issue that is legitimately important 
to the government. Taken as a whole, the city's Resolution presents 
a fairly straightforward example of the explicit negative reference 
test, for exactly the reasons given by the Kleinfeld opinion. The Res-
olution explicitly singles out the Cardinal, the Congregation, and the 
Vatican and directs a series of negative epithets in their direction. 
The Resolution is analogous to statement (6) above and-the issue 
of standing aside-was unconstitutional. 
What about Judge Silverman's attempted distinction between 
government comments on social or policy issues on the one hand 
and theological issues on the other hand? Might this work as an al-
ternative test for determining if a government message of some sort 
constitutes an unconstitutional disapproval of religion? Should we 
allow the government to criticize a religion as directly and effusively 
as it wants with respect to that religion's views on secular matters 
but prohibit the government from attacking in any way the religion's 
theological positions? 
At first glance, this test has some appeal. It would, for example, 
go some way toward addressing the issue raised earlier regarding the 
government's freedom to praise religious individuals and organiza-
tions for their secular achievements, like providing food or shelter 
for those in need. 68 Silverman's test would provide balance, allowing 
the state either to praise religion or criticize it for its so-called secu-
lar pursuits. And, of course, Silverman is right that the government 
has no business criticizing a religion's view about the nature of ulti-
mate reality or anything else that would appear to be clearly theolog-
ical. We surely wouldn't want the government to be able to make 
theological judgments like "There is no Tao" or "Transubstantiation 
is a Lie" or "The Eightfold Path to End Suffering Actually Has Nine 
Steps Not Eight."69 
The reason, however, that the government cannot make pro-
nouncements about the Tao or transubstantiation or the eightfold 
67. Id. 
68. See supra text accompanying notes 42-44. 
69. On the eightfold path, see WALPOLA SRI RAHULA, WHAT THE BUDDHA TAUGHT 45-50 
(2d ed. 1974). 
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path has nothing to do with whether those concepts are theological 
or secular from the perspective of the religion in question. It would 
be a mistake to assume that any religion sees a clear line (or, indeed, 
any line) between what it sees as its theological teachings and what 
it sees as its ethical, moral, social, or political teachings. The Catho-
lic Church likely views its positions on abortion or gay marriage as 
deeply related to its theology. When a Taoist supports the Endan-
gered Species Act because he believes that all beings are interrelated 
through the Tao, that judgment is not separate from the Taoist's 
theology. As the existence of the field of "theological ethics" sug-
gests, the relationship between theology and ethics is inseparable. At 
the very least, enabling courts to determine which aspects of a reli-
gion's teachings count as "secular" and which count as "theological" 
would be fraught with danger and directly at odds with the Estab-
lishment Clause's anti-entanglement norm?0 
The reason that we allow government to speak on some issues 
but not on others when it comes to religion has to do with our views 
about what issues government in the United States can properly 
concern itself with, rather than our views on what parts of a reli-
gion's dogma can reasonably be described as "theological." We want 
government to be able to comment on issues relating to abortion or 
gay marriage or welfare or nutrition or the justness of some military 
endeavor, because those issues are related to the proper role of gov-
ernment in a way that the question of whether Christ is really pre-
sent in the communion is not. But government already has the au-
thority to speak its mind on any of these "secular" (for lack of a 
better term) issues. It can put forth its view that abortion should be 
legal but not promoted by the state, or that gay marriage should (or 
should not) be allowed, or that the government should provide (or 
not provide) welfare to those in need, or that people should eat 
many servings of vegetables, or that we should (or should not) in-
vade Iraq. Nobody questions the government's authority to speak on 
these questions; the only issue when it comes to disapproval under 
the Establishment Clause is whether it can accompany these state-
ments with explicit criticisms of a religious individual, group, or tra-
dition that disagrees with the government's views. And, as I've sug-
gested above, the government will almost never need to attack a 
religion to make its views on a secular issue known to its citizens. 71 
70. On entanglement, see Scott C. Idleman, Religious Premises, Legislative judgments, and the 
Establishment Clause, 12 CORNELLj.L. & PUB. POL'Y l, 35-48 (2002). 
71. See supra text accompanying notes 40-42. 
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San Francisco could have sufficiently achieved its goals of supporting 
adoption by gay couples by issuing a Resolution putting forth its 
views about that matter and supporting those views with whatever 
data or moral argumentation it wished (analogous to statement (5)). 
It could even have made it clear that it was responding to the Vati-
can's position by referring to that position and stating simply its dis-
agreement without attacking the Vatican itself (statement (7)). Any-
thing more than that should be considered disapproval in violation 
of the First Amendment. 
It is probably worth considering what kinds of government 
statements the Silverman test would allow. Remember, the rule 
would basically immunize the government from saying anything it 
wants about any religion so long as it does so in the context of cri-
tiquing the religion's viewpoints on "secular" issues. 72 Do we really 
want the government to be able to lash out at religion like this? Im-
agine a city's resolution stating that the leaders of a religious group 
hostile to stem cell research are a "bunch of evil, small-brained, hate-
ful morons, intent on destroying the lives of millions of sick Ameri-
cans" or that an atheist group opposed to a proposed military opera-
tion is filled with "godless, soulless shells of people with no moral 
sense and the hearts of mice." I could go on, but the key point 
should be clear-we should have some doctrinal mechanism for pre-
venting the government from engaging in all out attacks on religion 
if we want a country where religious groups feel free to reflect on 
moral and political issues and engage their views on these matters in 
public without the fear of official persecution. 
The analysis provided here also answers the other key contention 
raised by Judge Silverman's opinion--the notion that government of-
ficials would be "gagged" from responding to religious entities that 
have taken a public position if those officials are not allowed to at-
tack the religious entity itself. This is simply untrue. The govern-
ment may put forth its affirmative arguments for the position it fa-
vors as strongly and as comprehensively and as frequently as it 
wants. It can use its money and access to the media and other inher-
ent advantages to express and disseminate its affirmative views 
whenever it chooses. The only way in which the Establishment 
Clause limits the government's authority to speak in this context is 
by prohibiting it from leveling explicit attacks on the religious indi-
viduals and groups who take a contrary position. This is hardly a gag. 
Rather, it represents a fair balance between the need for government 
72. See supra text accompanying notes 54--60. 
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to govern effectively with the protection that the First Amendment 
provides for religion. 
B. Awad v. Ziriax 
For what are surely complicated social, cultural, and political 
reasons, in the past few years a large number of states have begun 
considering laws and constitutional amendments to prohibit their 
courts from using Sharia law.l3 As of early 2011, at least forty 
measures in at least twenty states have been introduced that would, 
in one way or another, prohibit the use of Sharia law within the 
state. 74 Some of these proposals specifically name Sharia law, while 
others seek to prohibit, in some way, the use of "foreign" law, which 
would include Sharia law as well as the laws of other religious tradi-
tions. 75 A handful of proposals have in fact been enacted into law, 
the most notorious of which is Oklahoma's "Resolution 1056," enti-
tled the "Save Our State Amendment." 76 Resolution 1056 proposed 
to amend Section 1 of Article VII of the state constitution by prohib-
iting the use of Sharia law within Oklahoma as follows: 
The Courts provided for in subsection A of this section, when exer-
cising their judicial authority, shall uphold and adhere to the law as 
provided in the United States Constitution, the Oklahoma Consti-
tution, the United States Code, federal regulations promulgated 
pursuant thereto, . . . and if necessary the law of another state of 
the United States provided the law of the other state does not in-
clude Sharia Law, in making judicial decisions. The courts shall not 
look to the legal precepts of other nations or cultures. Specifically, 
the courts shall not consider international law or Sharia Law. The 
provisions of this subsection shall apply to all cases before the re-
spective courts including, but not limited to, cases of first impres-
sion.77 
Although State Representative Rex Duncan, the sponsor of Reso-
lution 1056, conceded that no Oklahoma court had ever used Sharia 
law, 78 he, along with other legislators who supported the measure, 
73. Seej.S.C., TheLawoftheLand, 97 A.B.A.)., Apr. 2011, at 14. 
74. See Bill Raftery, Bans on Court Use ofShariah/lnternational Law, GAVEL TO GAVEL Qune 3, 
20 II), http:/ /gaveltogavel.us/site/20 11/06/03/bans-on-court-use-of-shariainternational-law-38-
of-4 7 -bi !Is-died-or-rejected-this-session -only-1-enacted-i n to-law. 
75. See, e.g., H.R. 2064, 50th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2011), available at 
http:/ /www.azleg.gov /DocumentsForBill.asp?Bill_ Number= hb2064&Session _ld =I 02. 
76. H.R.j. Res. 1056, 52d Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Okla. 2010) (enrolled). 
77. I d., reprinted in A wad v. Ziriax, 754 F. Supp. 2d 1298, 1302 (W.O. Okla. 2010). 
78. Brief for The Am. jewish Comm., et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Plaintiff-Appellee 
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were outspoken in their criticism of Muslims in general and Sharia 
law specifically in their statements connected to the law?9 
The resolution was voted on directly by the voters of Oklahoma 
in a November 2010 election and was approved of overwhelmingly.80 
Before the amendment became effective, however, it was challenged 
in federal district court by a plaintiff who claimed, among other 
things, that the law's "official condemnation will result in a stigma 
attaching to his person, relegating him to an ineffectual position 
within the political community, and causing him injury."81 The dis-
trict judge agreed and issued a preliminary injunction enjoining the 
state from certifying election results and thus implementing the con-
stitutional amendment.82 Judge Miles-LaGrange's Establishment 
Clause analysis was brief and straightforward. In response to the de-
fendant's contention that the amendment was "merely a choice of 
law provision," the court found instead that the amendment, by sin-
gling out Sharia law for special negative treatment, had conveyed "a 
message of disapproval of plaintiffs faith." 83 The judge buttressed 
her view by relying on evidence presented demonstrating that "'Sha-
ria Law' is not actually 'law,' but is religious traditions that provide 
guidance to plaintiff and other Muslims regarding the exercise of 
their faith." 84 As a result, the court concluded that "plaintiffs reli-
gious traditions and faith are the only non-legal content subject to 
the judicial exclusion set forth in the amendment."85 In early 2012, 
at 29, Awad v. Ziriax, 670 F.3d 1111 (lOth Cir. 2012) (No. 10-6273) (reporting that having been 
asked whether any court in Oklahoma had ever decided a case using Sharia law, Rep. Duncan 
responded, "Not yet, and you know what, there will be any with passage of [the amendment]"). 
79. See id. at 9-11 (reporting, among other things, that "days before Oklahomans voted 
on [the amendment], Duncan noted in a public appearance that Sharia law's prevalence in the 
United Kingdom was 'a cancer upon the survivability of the UK'" (quoting Gale Courey Toens-
ing, Oklahoma Lawmakers Aim to Ban International and Sharia Law from State Courts, INDIAN CoUNTRY 
TODAY (Oct. 27, 2010), http://www.thecornerreport.com/index.php?p=7!06&more= 1 &c= 1& 
tb=1&pb=1). 
80. SeeAwad, 754 F. Supp. 2d 1298, 1302 (W.O. Okla. 2010) (stating that 70.08% of vot-
ers approved of the measure). 
81. Jd. at 1303. 
82. Id. at 1308. 
83. Jd. at 1306. 
84. Id. 
85. Id. The judge also found that the plaintiff had standing. See id. at 1303 ("Plaintiff has 
sufficiently set forth a personal stake in this action by alleging that he lives in Oklahoma, is a 
Muslim, that the amendment conveys an official government message of disapproval and hostili-
ty toward his religious beliefs."). Furthermore, the judge also believed the plaintiff had made out 
a sufficient showing for a free exercise violation based on his claim that the amendment would 
make it difficult for the state to probate his will and for Muslim plaintiffs to bring religious liber-
ty claims based on their beliefs in the future. Id. at 1307. I do not discuss these aspects of the 
court's decision here. 
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the Tenth Circuit affirmed, although on different grounds, as will be 
discussed below. 86 
In my view, the district court's conclusion that the amendment 
constituted a disapproval was correct, although this is clearly a dif-
ferent type of case from the San Francisco case. One key difference is 
that in the San Francisco case, both the reference to religion and the 
disapproval were explicit, whereas here the reference to religion is 
explicit,87 but the disapproval is probably best described as implicit. 
This is a good place, then, to make it clear that the "explicit" in "ex-
plicit negative reference" refers to the identification of the religion in 
question rather than to the disapproval. A message of disapproval, 
like a message of endorsement, can be sent in all sorts of ways, from 
the direct ("X religion" is "wrong" or "evil" or "callous" or "igno-
rant") to the implied. 
Here, the state has not-at least in the Resolution itself-
explicitly disapproved of Sharia law by condemning or criticizing it. 
Rather, it simply prohibited its use by state courts without explicitly 
articulating why this would be a good idea. Nonetheless, in my 
judgment, given all of the circumstances (the exercise of judgment 
given the totality of the circumstances is what is called for by the 
E/0 test), 88 the state has sent a message of disapproval here. The 
judge had it exactly right by focusing on the "singling out" aspect of 
the Oklahoma amendment. 89 True, the amendment mentioned "the 
legal precepts of other nations" and "international law" as well as 
"Sharia Law," but by not mentioning any other analogous systems of 
religious law (and there are many of these systems),90 the amend-
ment conveys that Sharia law is uniquely disfavored among systems 
86. A wad v. Ziriax, 670 F.3d 1111 (lOth Cir. 2012). 
87. I suppose there is a colorable claim here that the amendment's reference to "Sharia 
Law" is not a reference to religion. I believe the judge was correct, however, to conclude that 
"Sharia Law" is inherently religious, and I will not discuss the point further here. See Dominic 
McGoldrick, Accommodating Muslims in Europe: From Adopting Sharia Law to Religiously Based Opt Outs 
from Generally Applicable Laws, 9 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 603, 605-06 (2009) ("To believing Muslims, it 
is something deeper and higher, infused with moral and metaphysical purpose. At its core, shari-
ah represents the idea that all human beings-and all human governments-are subject to jus-
tice under the Jaw." (quoting Noah Feldman, Why Sharia?, N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE, Mar. 16, 2008, 
at 48)). 
88. See, e.g., David Goldberger, Capitol Square Review and Advisory Board v. Pinette: Be-
ware of Justice Scalia's Per Se Rule, 6 GEO. MASON L. REV. I, 4 (1997) (noting that the endorsement 
test requires a "careful assessment of the totality of all relevant facts and inferences in the record 
to determine whether there is an impermissible government endorsement ofreligion"). 
89. A wad, 754 F. Supp. 2d at 1306. 
90. See, e.g., FRANKS. RAVITCH, LAW AND RF.LJGJON, A READER: CASES, CONCEPTS, AND 
THEORY 881-955 (2d ed. 2008) (discussing, with materials, jewish Law, Islamic Law, Buddhist 
Law, Hindu Law, and Christian Law). 
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of religious law. Particularly when combined with the "Save our 
State" title, the Resolution clearly sends a message of disapproval of 
Sharia law to any reasonable believer or observer. 
What about the statements that were made by the sponsor and 
other supporters in favor of the amendment? According to an amicus 
brief filed in the Tenth Circuit in favor of the district court's deci-
sion,91 Representative Duncan and other supporters of the Resolu-
tion focused their support for the law on the need to stop Sharia law 
from making headway into Oklahoma.92 These supporters did not 
focus on any "legal precepts of other nations" that posed a danger to 
the state, and they made clear their disdain for Sharia law.93 For in-
stance, Representative Duncan argued that the newfound popularity 
of Sharia law in England had become "a cancer upon the survivability 
of the UK,"94 and that the Oklahoma Resolution would "constitute a 
pre-emptive strike against Sharia law coming to Oklahoma."95 
"While Oklahoma is still able to defend itself against this sort of 
hideous invasion," Duncan continued, "we should do so."96 
Should courts consider statements like these when deciding 
whether some particular legal action is an unconstitutional disap-
proval of religion? The question is an important one that is likely to 
recur in other cases, so it is worth commenting on here even though 
in this case the Resolution by itself sends a message of disapproval, 
thereby making it unnecessary for the courts to consider any external 
supporting statements. 97 Statements like these may be relevant to a 
disapproval challenge, in my opinion, not because they evidence an 
unconstitutional governmental purpose,98 but rather because they 
91. See Brief for The Am. Jewish Comm., supra note 78. The amici brief was filed on behalf 
of the following organizations: The American Jewish Committee, Americans United for Separa-
tion of Church and State, The Anti--Defamation League, The Baptist Joint Committee for Reli-
gious Liberty, The Center for Islamic Pluralism, Interfaith Alliance, and The Union f()r Reform 
Judaism. 
92. Id. at 9--12. 
93. Id. at 23-24. 
94. I d. at 9 (quoting Toensing, supra note 79). 
95. ld. 
96. Id. at 10. 
97. The district court did not point to any supporting statements in favor of its conclu-
sion. Because I do not think these statements are necessary to support a finding of unconstitu-
tionality, I have not engaged in any independent research or analysis regarding them. 
98. Courts, of course, continue to use purpose analysis in Establishment Clause challeng-
es. See, e.g., Awad v. Ziriax, 754 F. Supp. 2d 1298, 1305-06 (W.O. Okla. 2010), aff'd, 670 F.3d 
1111 (lOth Cir. 2012). I find purpose analysis unsatisfying and potentially overly restrictive on 
the free speech rights of legislators, but I also think that the same evidence which can show a 
religious purpose can often be used to show that a message will objectively be received as pro-
moting or disapproving of religion. 
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can, under certain circumstances, contribute to conveying an objec-
tive message of disapproval. In a case, for example, where the law on 
its face may or may not be understood as sending a message of dis-
approval (for instance, with those laws that ban Sharia law as one 
aspect of "foreign law"), 99 evidence that the sponsors of the law 
made public statements that themselves expressed disapproval can 
go a long way toward showing that the law itself would be under-
stood by a reasonable observer as conveying a similar message. 100 
As noted above, the Tenth Circuit recently affirmed the district 
court, but not on a disapproval theory. 101 Instead, the appeals court 
found the Oklahoma amendment unconstitutional because it dis-
criminated against Islam in violation of the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Larson v. Valente, 102 which prohibits the government from dis-
criminating against any particular religion or sect. 103 The Tenth 
Circuit's view highlights a second crucial difference between Awad 
and more typical disapproval cases, such as San Francisco. The Okla-
homa amendment, in addition to sending a message of disapproval, 
also imposed a real legal disability upon the plaintiff and other Mus-
lims by prohibiting them from, for instance, relying on their reli-
gion's teachings in Oklahoma courts in cases involving probate mat-
ters or religious expression. As such, the Tenth Circuit's theory was 
an appropriate alternative for striking down the amendment. It is 
worth noting, however, that the theory would not work had the gov-
ernment sent the same message of disapproval without imposing the 
attendant legal disability-for example, if it has simply adopted a 
resolution condemning Sharia law or criticizing Islam. 
C. C.F. v. Capistrano Unified School District 
This case involves a challenge to certain alleged statements made 
by a teacher named James Corbett in his Advanced Placement Euro-
pean History course at Capistrano Valley High School in southern 
California. 104 A student in the class, Chad Farnan (referred to as 
99. See supra text accompanying note 75. 
100. I've made this point in the context of endorsement before. See jay D. Wexler, Preparing 
for the Clothed Public Square: Teaching About Religion, Civic Education, and the Constitution, 43 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 1159, 1253-54 & n.361 (2002). 
101. Awad v. Ziriax, 670 F.3d llll (lOth Cir. 2012). 
102. 456 U.S. 228 (1982). 
103. A wad, 670 F.3d at 1126-33. 
104. C.F. v. Capistrano Unified Sch. Dist., 615 F. Supp. 2d 1137, 1140 (C. D. Cal. 2009), 
vacated sub nom. C. F. ex rei. Farnan v. Capistrano Unified Sch. Dist., 654 F.3d 975 (9th Cir. 2011), 
cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1566 (2012). 
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"C.F." in court documents), sued the school district and the teacher, 
claiming that many of Corbett's statements violated the Establish-
ment Clause by disapproving of religion and Christianity. 105 James 
Selna, the district court judge hearing the case, held for the school 
district on all of Farnan's challenges except for one. 106 On that one 
claim, the judge nonetheless found that the school district could not 
be held liable for Corbett's statements. 107 In later proceedings, the 
judge also found that Corbett could not himself be held personally 
liable for money damages, because the right he had violated was not 
"clearly established" as required for a finding of§ 1983 liability, 108 a 
holding affirmed by the Ninth Circuit. 109 
Four of Corbett's comments challenged by Farnan are of particu-
lar interest for the purposes of the Article: 110 
(I)"Abstinence-only policies do not work." 111 
(2) "I will not leave John Peloza [a teacher who sued Corbett for ad-
vising a school newspaper that claimed Peloza taught religion in his 
science classroom] alone to propagandize kids with this religious, 
superstitious nonsense." 112 
(3)"What was it that Mark Twain said? 'Religion was invented 
when the first con man met the first fool.">ll3 
(4)"[C]onservatives don't want women to avoid pregnancies. That's 
interfering with God's work. You got to stay pregnant, barefoot, 
and in the kitchen and have babies until your body collapses. All 
over the world, doesn't matter where you go, the conservatives 
want control over women's reproductive capacity. Everywhere in 
the world. From conservative Christians in this country to, urn, 
Muslim fundamentalists in Afghanistan. It's the same. It's stunning 
how vitally interested they are in controlling women." 114 
105. Id. 
106. ld. at 1153-55. 
107. Id. at 1154-55. 
108. C.F. v. Capistrano Unified Sch. Dist., 656 F. Supp. 2d 1190, 1206 (C.D. Cal. 2009), 
affd sub nom. Capistrano, 654 F.3d 975 (9th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1566 (2012). 
109. Capistrano, 654 F.3d at 988. 
110. Actually, many of Corbett's comments, and the court's responses to the comments, 
are interesting from the perspective of what constitutes disapproval, but for the sake of relative 
brevity, I will confine my analysis to these four, because they are the most interesting. 
Ill. Capistrano, 615 F. Supp. 2d at 1142. This is the court's paraphrase of Corbett's com-
ment. 
112. Id. at 1146. 
113. ld. 
114. Id. at 1150 (alteration in original). 
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The court ruled for the plaintiff with respect to comment (2) but 
against him on the other three comments. The court described 
comment (1) as an example of a statement that "do[es] not touch 
upon or mention religion" and found that such statements "do[] not 
violate the Establishment Clause merely because a particular reli-
gious group may find the official's position incorrect or offensive." 115 
Otherwise, the judge observed, teachers would have to "tailor [their] 
comments so as not to offend or disagree with any religious group," 
something that would be "unworkable given the number of different 
religious viewpoints on various issues." 116 On comment (2), howev-
er, the court found that Corbett lacked any legitimate secular pur-
pose for stating his "unequivocal belief that creationism is 'supersti-
tious nonsense,"' 117 and that he had sent a "message of disapproval 
of religion or creationism." 118 According to the judge: "Corbett 
could have criticized Peloza for teaching religious views in class 
without disparaging those views." 119 
Though the court found comments (1) and (2) to pose relatively 
easy questions, it found that comments (3) and (4) were somewhat 
more difficult. With regard to the Mark Twain quotation from com-
ment (3), the court noted that it required "close scrutiny."120 Alt-
hough the court conceded that the Twain quotation was "biting," 121 
it nonetheless found that Corbett's invocation of it passed constitu-
tional muster for at least two reasons: because "[t]he remark comes 
as part of a historical discussion of the tension between religion and 
science," 122 and because it was "not clear that Corbett was espous-
ing Twain's view rather than merely quoting it." 123 Thus, the court 
concluded that the primary purpose of the comment was not "to dis-
parage"124 and that its effect "was not to disapprove of religion." 125 
Finally, on comment ( 4), the court said this: 
Corbett is primarily giving his opinion that women should have 
control over reproductive choices. As discussed above, even if cer-
115. ld. at 1142. 
116. I d. 
117. Id.at1146. 
118. Id. at 1149. 
119. /d. 
120. !d. at 1146. 
121. !d. 
122. !d. 
123. Jd. at 1147. 
124. I d. 
125. Id. at 1149. 
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tain religious groups find Corbett's position on the political issue 
offensive or incorrect, there is no violation of the Establishment 
Clause. The Court recognizes, however, that Corbett is also ex-
pressing disapproval of certain religious positions on the issue. 
However, . . . it seems that the statements from which disapprov-
al can be inferred are only incidental and ancillary to Corbett's pri-
mary political point regarding reproduction. 126 
The court reached the correct result with regard to comments (1) 
and (2). Because the comment about abstinence-only policies did not 
expressly refer to religion, it does not run afoul of the explicit nega-
tive reference test and is therefore not unconstitutional. I would take 
slight issue with the court's use of the phrase "not touching upon 
religion," 127 however. What distinguishes the comment is that it 
does not explicitly mention religion; it is harder to say whether it 
"touches upon religion." One might plausibly say that it does touch 
upon religion by implying that certain religious views about educa-
tion do not work. Certainly somebody who strongly believes, be-
cause of her religion, that schools should teach abstinence and that 
abstinence education works would think that the comment "touch-
es" upon her religion. Likewise, the court was right to condemn the 
"superstitious nonsense" 128 comment; this is as clear a violation of 
the explicit negative reference test as one can imagine. The govern-
ment has no business declaring that somebody's religious beliefs are 
nonsense. 
Comments (3) and (4) indeed pose more difficult questions. Re-
garding the Mark Twain quotation, the key question is whether the 
teacher was simply using the quote to illustrate what some people 
have said about religion, or whether the teacher was in fact express-
ing his own view through the quotation. If, for example, Corbett had 
said something like, "Is religion something a reasonable person be-
lieves in? Well, what is it that Mark Twain said" and then gave the 
quote, the argument would become quite strong that the teacher had 
sent a message of disapproval. On the other hand, if Corbett's re-
mark was more in the manner of" in the past 150 years, many people 
have questioned the validity of religious belief. One of those people 
was Mark Twain, who once said ... ,"then the quotation becomes 
126. Id. at 1150 (citing Am. Fam. Ass'n v. City & Cty. of S.F., 277 F.3d 1114, 1123 (9th 
Cir. 2002) (finding that a resolution disparaging anti-gay ads supported by a religious group was 
not unconstitutional because "any statements from which disapproval can be inferred [were] 
only incidental and ancillary")). 
127. Id. at 1142. 
128. Id. at 1146. 
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constitutionally acceptable. The distinction is essentially the one be-
tween teaching religion on the one hand and teaching about religion 
on the other. 129 The government may, and indeed should, teach stu-
dents about religion to create citizens who can understand our most 
difficult public issues, and this entails teaching them about promi-
nent historical and current critiques of religion, but the government 
should not, and cannot, teach students that religion (or any particu-
lar religion) is good, bad, true, or false. Without access to more facts 
(a transcript of the class, for instance), it is hard to evaluate the 
court's analysis of this issue, but at least one of the questions it 
asked (whether Corbett was "espousing" Twain's view) 130 gets pret-
ty close to the central issue. It is worth observing, however, that the 
court's other key point-that the remark came as part of a "historical 
discussion" 131-is not by itself meaningful. If the teacher espoused 
the Twain view, then he acted unconstitutionally, even if he es-
poused it in the context of a historical discussion. 
Finally, there are the comments about religion and reproduction. 
The matter is surely close, but from the information provided by the 
opinion, it appears that the court got this issue wrong. The teacher 
clearly identified religion as one of the sources of his displeasure, not 
only naming "conservative Christians" and "Muslim fundamental-
ists" but also invoking "God's work." 132 And there's no question 
that his diatribe expresses disapproval of the positions of these be-
lievers. The key sentence expressing this disapproval is "[y ]ou got to 
stay pregnant, barefoot, and in the kitchen and have babies until 
your body collapses." 133 On the other hand, it may well be true that, 
taken as a whole, the main message of the teacher's comments is 
that women should have control over their reproductive choices. So 
the question is whether one or two negative remarks about religion 
can be unconstitutional if embedded within a larger message that is 
unquestionably valid. The court says no, citing an earlier Ninth Cir-
cuit case for the proposition that if negative statements are "inci-
dental" and "ancillary" to a larger message, then they are insulated 
from constitutional attack. 134 I disagree. It is one thing if the overall 
context of the statement makes it clear that the isolated comments 
129. For a comprehensive discussion of this issue, see generally Wexler, supra note 100. See 
also Kent Greenawalt, Teaching About Religion in the Public Schools, 18 j.L. & POL. 329 (2002). 
130. Capistrano, 615 F. Supp. 2d at 1147. 
131. Jd.at1146. 
132. Id. at 1150. 
133. Jd. 
134. Id. (citing Am. Fam. Ass'n v. City ofS.F., 277 F.3d 1114, 1123 (9th Cir. 2002)). 
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about religion are really not disapproving (for example, if the context 
made it clear that the statements were made in jest or sarcastically), 
but there's no reason why the government should be able to make 
statements disapproving of religion so long as it makes them in the 
context of a bigger discussion that is not about religion. If the anti-
Catholic resolution in San Francisco, for example, had ten "whereas" 
clauses, and only one of them disapproved of Catholicism, why 
should that one clause be immunized? The real issue is why that one 
clause could be there in the first place. It adds nothing legitimate to 
the rest of the message, and it imposes a significant harm upon reli-
gious believers. Likewise, the comments about reproduction add 
nothing and impose great harm. The teacher was free to communi-
cate his beliefs that women should be given control over reproduc-
tive choices, but he went over the line by throwing in unnecessary 
derogatory comments about religion. 135 
III. CONCLUSION: DISAPPROVAL'S FUTURE 
Claims that government has disapproved of religion are not ex-
actly threatening to clog the court system, but as I have tried to show 
in this Article, such claims are completely consistent with the struc-
ture of the Religion Clauses and have in fact made it to the federal 
courts on several occasions. The claims seem to be coming more fre-
quently, and with both religious diversity and nonbelief on the rise 
in the United States, there is reason to think that disapproval con-
troversies will increase over time rather than decrease. The disap-
proval side of what I've termed the E/D test, then, will continue to 
play an important role in limiting the government's ability to openly 
denigrate the strongly held religious beliefs of the nation's citizens. 
Deciding what counts as disapproval and what does not count as dis-
approval will not be an easy task. I have proposed a test here, called 
the "explicit negative reference test," that seeks to provide a worka-
ble and reasonable line to distinguish constitutional government 
statements, messages, displays, and symbols from unconstitutional 
135. One might counter here that this interpretation of the disapproval prong of the E/D 
test is inconsistent with the way that courts have applied the endorsement side of that test, 
since courts have held that the government can de-religion-ify a religious display (like a creche) 
by surrounding it with nonreligious figures (like a clown or elephant). See Lynch v. Donnelly, 
465 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). I am not sure if these cases are truly inconsistent with what I am say-
ing here (it is not clear to me if a display is the same as a stated message), but I would also note 
that I think the courts have not been nearly tough enough when applying the endorsement side 
of the E/D test. Government endorsements of religion should not be tolerated simply because 
the government surrounds those endorsements with secular messages. 
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ones, but the test is by no means automatic or simple to apply. Oth-
ers may, of course, propose competing tests that either reach further 
or are more limited than my own. No matter what, however, one 
would expect that any test seeking to enforce the anti-disapproval 
norm of the Establishment Clause would make some nonnegligible 
set of government utterances hostile to religion off limits in order to 
protect the rights of religious believers. 
Before bringing this argument to a close, however, it is worth re-
calling that the anti-disapproval rule, whatever its specific content 
may turn out to be, is only one side of the larger E/D test. Disap-
proval, for better or worse, is joined at the hip with endorsement. If 
the endorsement side of the E/D test goes, so too goes the disap-
proval side. The E/D test has always had its naysayers, both in the 
courts and in the academy, and with the recent departure of the 
test's creator, Justice O'Connor, and her replacement with conserva-
tive Justices Roberts and Alita, some have speculated that the test 
may end up leaving the court with her. 136 This would be a terrible 
shame. Not only does the E/D test protect nonbelievers from having 
to endure official government messages that mark them as second-
class citizens, it also-as I have shown here-protects believers from 
having to endure the same kinds of messages. Those anti-religion 
messages have been rare up until now, but they may not remain rare 
forever. Without the E/D test, courts will possess no doctrinal 
weapon to prevent the government from lashing out against religious 
views. The Supreme Court would be wise to keep the E/D test as it 
stands, and to use it to protect all the nation's citizens, regardless of 
what religion they believe in, and even if they believe in no religion 
at all. 
136. See, e.g., Jan Bartrum, Salazar v. Buono: Sacred Symbolism and the Secular State, 104 Nw. 
U. L. REV. 1653, 1659-60 (2010) ("For the most part, Justice O'Connor's approach has main-
tained the support of a tenuous majority since 1992, but with her retirement in 2006, it was un-
clear whether the test would long survive."); Eugene Volokh, Is the Endorsement Test up for Grabs in 
New Supreme Court Case?, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Feb. 23, 2009, 11:32 AM), 
http://volokh.com/posts/1235406739.shtml ("My guess is that there are now 5 votes on the 
Court rejecting the endorsement test: Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas, who have criticized 
the test in the past, and Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Ali to, who I suspect (based on the ju-
risprudential camp from which they come) would agree with the other conservatives."). 
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